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Abstract
In a version of the Diamond and Dybvig [8] model with aggregate uncertainty, we
show that there exists an equilibrium with the following properties: all consumers
deposit at the bank, all patient consumers wait for the last period to withdraw, and the
bank fails with strictly positive probability. Furthermore, we show that the probability
of a bank failure remains bounded away from zero as the number of consumers increases.
This equilibrium explains bank failures driven by extreme withdrawals solely on
liquidity since they happen because both banks and depositors are illiquid. Furthermore,
it does not require many of the elements typically emphasized, including: consumers
well informed about the true state of nature, a non-zero consumption after a crisis,
consumers’ panic and sunspots. We therefore think that aggregate risk in Diamond-
Dybvig-like environments can be an important element to explain bank crises.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, G21.
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1 Introduction
Throughout history, we observe many episodes of a large number of people withdrawing
their deposits from a bank, forcing it to fail. Since the work of Diamond and Dybvig [8],
these episodes are understood as runs to illiquid banks: in a bank run, many or all of the
bank’s depositors attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously, even those who are not
in need of funds; these depositors want to withdraw because banks are illiquid and expected
to fail due to these large withdrawals.
An alternative explanation of bank failures caused by large withdrawals is simply that
they are caused by too many people in need of liquidity. While this explanation also
depends on the (lack of) liquidity of banks, it does not require those who do not need funds
to withdraw. In fact, this explanation depends purely on liquidity: these bank failures occur
because both banks and depositors are illiquid.
We show that bank failures caused by large withdrawals can occur as an equilibrium
phenomenon even without the economic elements traditionally emphasized as leading to
bank runs. This establishes the above pure liquidity view as a sound theoretical explanation
of bank failures caused by large withdrawals.
More precisely, we consider an environment similar to the one in Diamond and Dybvig
[8]. The economy lasts for three periods. Consumers, who are all alike ex-ante, can be of two
distinct types: impatient consumers, who need to consume early, and patient consumers,
willing to postpone consumption.1
In contrast to those authors, we assume that there is a finite number of consumers, al-
though this number will increase to infinity. We assume that there is aggregate uncertainty,
modeled in the following way: first, the probability of each consumer being impatient is
chosen according to a continuous density function; then, the consumers’ type is determined
1As in their paper, we assume that the relative risk aversion coefficient exceeds one, but only for con-
sumption levels above one (which is all that is needed for their results). In contrast to them, we assume
that the utility of zero consumption is finite — obviously, otherwise there could not be a bank failure in
equilibrium.
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in an i.i.d. way. As in Diamond and Dybvig, the consumers’ type is their own private
information. Furthermore, we assume that although each consumer knows his type, he does
not know the true value of the probability of each consumer being impatient.
There are two technologies: storage with a constant rate of return and a productive
technology whose rate of return dominates that of storages in the long run and is dominated
in the short run. This implies that, in the absence of some financial asset, impatient
consumers will receive a lower rate of return than do patient consumers. Thus, the main
economic problem is how to share the risk of being an impatient consumer.
Risk sharing can be provided by banks. Consumers can deposit their initial endowment
in a bank, or invest it directly. The banking system is assumed to be competitive and banks
therefore offer contracts to depositors in order to maximize their ex-ante welfare.
Regarding the contracts that banks offer to consumers, we assume that the bank can
only make payments contingent on whether it has failed (in which case it pays nothing)
or not.2 Although this assumption can be (partially) justified by assuming that the only
verifiable information is whether or not the bank has failed,3 our motivation is to assume it
is to study whether or not it is possible to have bank failures driven by illiquid depositors
when banks offer contracts akin to those observed in practice.
Our first main result then shows that if the population size is sufficiently high and if a
sufficiently high fraction of impatient consumers is possible to occur,4 then there exists an
2We assume that consumers are isolated from each other, which implies the same trading restrictions
(i.e., that depositors cannot sell their position at the bank) as in Diamond and Dybvig [8]. The importance
of these trading restrictions has been analyzed by Jacklin [17].
3One can consider the framework of Andolfatto and Nosal [4] and consider the case of partial costless
verification, where the verifiable information is whether or not the bank has failed. Specifically, we could
assume that a monetary authority provides such information and punishes the bank when it falsely claims to
have failed. However, this story provides only partial justification for our assumption since, as an anonymous
referee has pointed out, it raises the question of why does the monetary authority not use those punishments
to design more sophisticated contracts, such as the one considered in Green and Lin [13, 14].
4i.e., if the support of density function determining the probability of each consumer being impatient
contains values sufficiently close to one.
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equilibrium in which every consumer deposits, no patient consumer withdraws early and
the bank fails with a strictly positive probability.
In the above equilibrium, the bank failure corresponds to a situation where the fraction
of impatient consumers is high. In such a case, a large number of depositors wants to
withdraw, forcing the bank to fail. Since no patient consumer withdraws, this failure is
not due to a bank run, but rather is caused by an extreme need of liquidity. This extreme
need of liquidity leading to bank failures can be the result, for example, of poor economic
conditions, as suggested by the empirical work of Gorton [12], Kaminsky and Reinhart [15]
and Calomiris and Mason [6].
The probability of having a large number of impatient consumers, and therefore that of a
bank failure, depends on both the realized and the expected number of impatient consumers
(the latter being equal to the probability of each consumer being impatient). By the law of
large numbers, in large economies only the second effect is important. Therefore, we might
have a positive, but vanishing probability of a bank failure, in which case the importance of
the purely liquidity-driven bank failures we are emphasizing would be negligible. Our second
main result shows that this is not the case: it establishes, under the same assumptions, that
the probability of a bank run is bounded away from zero as the population size increases
to infinity.
A positive and non-vanishing probability of a bank failure in equilibrium is due to
conjunction of illiquid banks and illiquid consumers. Furthermore, it depends on how
illiquid the bank is, since the higher is the interest offered, the higher is the probability of
a bank failure. In fact, we can rephrase our second main result as showing that the interest
offered by the bank is higher and bounded away from 1.
More precisely, consider a large economy, in which we are mainly interested. By the law
of large numbers, as the number of consumers increases, the fraction of impatient depositors
in the population converges to the probability of each one being impatient. In the limit,
if the support of the density function determining the probability of each consumer being
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impatient is [t, t¯], the bank will fail with a positive probability whenever it offers an interest
rate higher than r¯ = 1/t¯. Our second main result shows that the interest offered by the
bank is higher and bounded away from r¯. This implies that the desire to offer liquidity and
a better risk sharing to impatient consumers is sufficiently high to compensate for the risk
of a bank failure, in which some consumers will not be able to consume.
As we have illustrated above, most of our analysis is done by studying what happens in
the limit as the number of consumers increases to infinity. In this way, our paper provides
an example of Hildenbrand’s [16] approach to study large economies with independent
individual risks and in which per capita uncertainty vanishes. As is normally the case,
there is no limit economy to which the sequence of finite economies we consider converges.
Nevertheless, we show that all the functions used to define both the consumer’s and bank’s
problem in the finite economies converge uniformly and that the law of large numbers holds.
From the analysis of the limit problem, we are able to deduce the conclusions of our main
results.
Of course, we could have simply analyzed the limit problem, which is rather similar
to the problem considered by Diamond and Dybvig. The advantage of explicitly having a
sequence of finite economies is that, although inferred from the study of a limit economy,
our results cannot be regarded as an artifact of an infinite population.5
2 Related Literature
Regarding the main results of the paper, our inspiration comes from Wallace [23, p. 12],
where he writes: “In my model, the cause of a bank run and a partial suspension is exogenous
— an aggregate shock to tastes that makes the number of people wanting to withdraw
unusually large.” As in Wallace’s work, a bank failure, although not a bank run, will occur
here when the number of impatient consumers is high. Our results have two other important
differences compared with Wallace’s: first, bank crises have more severe consequences in our
5See Barlo and Carmona [5], Carmona [7] and Meirowitz [18] for more on this issue.
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results, since they cause banks to fail, whereas in Wallace’s they lead to a partial suspension;
second, Wallace’s result relies on the assumption that there is a small amount of aggregate
risk limited to a small group of individuals, which is not needed in ours — we believe that
our result allows us to think of bank failures as a large-scale, society-wide phenomenon.6
A similar conclusion was established in Williamson [25]. In his model, banks are large
coalitions of agents that write optimal contracts contingent on the state of nature. The
allocation obtained in an equilibrium with banking coalition improves, in some states of
nature, upon the allocation that would arise through decentralized capital markets, thus
providing a rationale for banks. In some other states, associated with low output, both
equilibria yield the same allocation, in which case one can expect that the bank will dissolve
(say, to save on organizational costs). The main difference between these and our results
is that, while bank failures in our framework have the same features as in [25] (namely,
both output and utility are lower than average and deposit withdrawals are greater than
average), they are also characterized by promises to pay that are not kept.
Our results are also related to those in Goldstein and Pauzner [11]. Here, as there, the
probability of a bank failure increases in the degree of risk sharing offered by the bank but,
despite such probability, the allocation so obtained improves consumers’ welfare relative to
autarky. Unlike their model, bank failures in our framework are not panic-based.
An important aspect of our results is that they allow bank failures driven by large
withdrawals to occur in the presence of many elements that make them costly to consumers
and/or difficult to occur in equilibrium. These include: (1) absence of consumers’ panic, (2)
absence of sunspots, (3) absence of mixed strategies, (4) sequential service constraint (and
so zero consumption to late withdrawers), (5) an infinite marginal utility of consumption
at zero, (6) absence of information about the true state of the economy, (7) recoverability
of investment in the productive technology, and (8) a non-negligible probability of a high
fraction of impatient consumers occurring.
6See Peck and Shell [20] and Ennis and Keister [9] for a similar point.
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We will comment briefly on each of these elements: Since all patient consumers prefer
to wait, there is no consumers’ panic in the bank failures of our model, an element that was
important in Diamond and Dybvig [8], Peck and Shell [19] and Goldstein and Pauzner [11],
among others. Typically, consumers’ panic in equilibrium is obtained using sunspots, which
are a crucial element for consumers to prefer to deposit despite the fact that the bank may
fail (again, see Diamond and Dybvig [8] and Peck and Shell [19]). We emphasize that our
results do not require sunspots.
We restrict consumer choice to pure strategies. Without this assumption one can show
the existence of a positive probability of a bank run, and of a bank failure, as in Ada˜o and
Temzelides [1].
We also require banks to satisfy a sequential service constraint (which implies that,
after it fails, late withdrawers will receive zero consumption). At the same time, we allow
for an infinite marginal utility of consumption at zero, which together with the previous
assumptions makes bank failures costly to those consumers who are unable to withdraw.
We assume that consumers have no information about the true state of the economy,
and that the investment in the productive technology can be recovered — without these two
assumptions, one can generate bank failures (and even bank runs) in which consumers run
when the state of the economy is bad, as in Allen and Gale [2]. Furthermore, as has been
shown by Goldstein and Pauzner [11], the same conclusion holds even if investment can be
recovered and consumers have imperfect information about the true state of the economy.
Finally, we allow for a non-negligible probability of a high fraction of impatient con-
sumers occurring. This increases the risk of a bank failure, which is costly. All of this
suggests that the type of bank crises we address are quite robust in our Diamond and
Dybvig framework.
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3 The model
In this section we formally describe the model. The model presented here is similar to that
in Diamond and Dybvig [8].
There are three periods T = 0, 1, 2. There is a single consumption good. There are
two technologies: first, the consumer good can be stored from one period to the other; the
gross rate of return equals 1. Second, there is a productive technology, by which one unit
invested in period 0 yields R, with R > 1, units of consumption in period 2; furthermore, if
the investment is interrupted in period 1, it will yield one unit (i.e., the investment can be
recovered).
There is a finite number of consumers denoted by n ∈ N. All consumers are identical
in period 0. Consumers receive an endowment of one unit of consumption good in period 0
and zero in the remaining periods.
Each consumer can be of two distinct types, denoted by type 1 and type 2. A type 1
consumer values consumption in period 1 only (impatient consumer), whereas a type 2 con-
sumer values consumption only in period 2 (patient consumer): Let c1 denote the individual
consumption received by a consumer in period 1, let c2 denote individual consumption re-
ceived in period 2, and let Θ be the type of the agent. The utility derived by every agent
from the consumption of the bundle (c1, c2) is
U(c1, c2,Θ) =
 u(c1) if Θ = 1,u(c1 + c2) otherwise, (1)
where u : R+ → R is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly
concave. Furthermore, we assume:
Assumption 1 1. −cu′′(c)/u′(c) > 1 for c ≥ 1;
2. u(0) = 0.
Every agent is assumed to maximize the ex-ante (relative to period 0) expected utility
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E[U(c1, c2,Θ)].7
The type of each consumer is determined by nature in 1 as follows: first, a number
in t ∈ [0, 1] is drawn according to a probability measure µ; then each consumer’s type
is drawn in an i.i.d. way with a probability t of being of type 1. It follows that the
fraction of impatient consumers equals i ∈ Sn = {k/n : k = 0, . . . , n} with probability
pn,t(i) = tni(1− t)n−ni when there are n consumers and the probability of each being a type
1 is t.
Each consumer knows his own type, but not the type of the others; i.e., consumers’ type
is their own private information. Furthermore, no consumer knows the realized value of t.
We make the following assumptions on the uncertainty:
Assumption 2 1. The support of µ is an interval contained in [0, t′], where 0 < t′ ≤ 1;
2. there exists a continuous function f : supp(µ)→ R+ such that µ(B) =
∫
B f for every
Borel measurable set B ⊆ [0, 1].
The continuity of the density f implies that if t¯ = max{t : t ∈ supp(µ)}, then F (t) =∫ t
0 f < 1 for all t < t¯. Given any t¯ ∈ [0, 1], we write f ∈ Ft¯,B,x when f is continuous,
bounded by B > 0, t¯ = max{t : t ∈ supp(µ)} and x = ∫ 10 tf(t)dt.
We next describe the banking industry. There is a representative bank behaving com-
petitively. The bank offers to the depositors a contract specifying a fixed claim of r per
7An example of a function satisfying all of the above assumptions is u(c) = − exp−2c+1. In this case,
we would have limc→0 u′(c) = 2. An example of a function satisfying limc→0 u′(c) = ∞ can be obtained as
follows: let
v(c) =
8><>:
√
c if c ≤ 1/2,
−
√
2c−1
4
+
√
2 otherwise.
(2)
The function v is continuous in [1/4,∞) and smooth in B = [1/4, 1/2− ε]∪ [1/2+ ε,∞), where 0 < ε < 1/4.
Then, there exists a smooth function v˜ : [1/4,∞)→ R such that v˜/B = v/B . Then, let
u(c) =
8>><>>:
√
c if 0 ≤ c ≤ 1/2− ε,
v˜(c) if 1/2− ε < c < 1/2 + ε,
−
√
2c−1
4
+
√
2 if c > 1/2 + ε.
(3)
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unit deposited to agents withdrawing in period 1. The bank is mutually owned, and it is
liquidated in period 2. This implies that period 2 withdrawers will share the remainder of
the bank’s assets equally among themselves.
If and when the bank fails, consumers will be informed (say, by a regulatory entity).
The bank is closed and the remaining assets are distributed in period 2 to those claiming
them. We assume that no impatient consumer will claim anything in period 2; in any case,
an impatient consumer is indifferent between claiming or not, and so we can justify this
assumption by postulating a positive cost of exercising it.
Thus, the amounts received by depositors are as follows: Let A denote the total amount
deposited in period 0 and r be the interest rate offered by the bank. Consider a depositor
j willing to withdraw in period 1 and let lj denote the number of withdrawers arriving
at the bank before consumer j. Then j’s period 1 payoff is equal to r if r(lj + 1) ≤ A
and 0 otherwise. That is, if the bank can fully pay him, he will receive r. In contrast, if
r(lj + 1) > A, then the bank is closed and the remaining assets (equal to A− rlj) are kept
for period 2.8
If a depositor waits for period 2 to withdraw, then he receives
max
{
R(A− rl)
h
, 0
}
, (4)
where l denotes the number of depositors who have withdrawn in period 1 and h denotes
the number of those that have not withdrawn in period 1 and want to withdraw in period
2. Since we assume that no impatient consumer wants to withdraw in period 2, h equals
the number of patient consumers who have not withdrawn in period 1.
We assume that consumers are isolated from each other during period 1, although each
one contacts the bank at some point in that period. As Wallace [22] has shown, this implies
that the bank has to satisfy a sequential service constraint; that is, the bank must serve the
depositors withdrawing in period 1 in the (random) order that they arrive at the bank until
8Alternatively, we could assume that depositor j receives A − rlj , but this would only complicate our
analysis.
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it runs out of assets. We assume that all orderings are equally likely, and so each occurs
with a probability of 1/m! when there are 0 ≤ m ≤ n withdrawers. In order to evaluate
different strategies, each consumer needs to know the probability of arriving at the bank
before it fails. If the bank can fully pay k depositors, then the probability that a given
consumer is fully paid equals
α
(
m
n
,
k
n
)
= min
{
1,
k(m− 1)!
m!
}
= min
{
1,
k
m
}
= min
{
1,
k/n
m/n
}
. (5)
In the above definition of α we use as arguments the fraction of depositors trying to withdraw
and the fraction of depositors that can be fully paid in period 1. In general, this probability
depends on the interest rate r offered by the bank and on the strategies chosen by the other
consumers. We let kn(r) satisfy rkn(r) ≤ 1 and r(kn(r) + 1/n) > 1; thus, nkn(r) is the
number of depositors that can be fully paid in period 1 when the bank offers r and all
consumers deposit.
A strategy of the bank is the choice of r ∈ [1, R]; the bank chooses r in order to maximize
ex-ante utility of the consumers (recall that they are equal ex-ante). This behavior is
motivated by the competitive nature of the banking industry.9 More generally, we could
assume that the bank offers r ∈ R, but risk-aversion will ensure that r ∈ [1, R]. The bank
chooses the interest rate in period 0 and then announces it to the consumers.
In period 0, each consumer will choose whether to deposit given the interest rate of-
fered by the bank; those who do not deposit will invest in the productive technology. For
simplicity, we assume that consumers have to deposit all of the endowment.10 In period 1
each consumer learns her type and then chooses either to withdraw from the bank or to
wait, depending on her type, on the interest rate and on her deposit choice. Consumers
who withdraw their deposit in period 1 can either consume the goods received or store
9Ada˜o and Temzelides [1] have shown in a similar framework that another type of bank’s behavior is
possible in equilibrium; however, bank’s maximization of the ex-ante utility of the consumers is the only
behavior plausible in more refined notions of equilibrium.
10In fact, our results extend to the case where consumers are allowed to deposit just a fraction of their
endowment.
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them.11 Hence, a strategy for a consumer is (d,w), where d is a function from [1, R] into
{0, 1}, and w is a function from [1, R] × {0, 1} × Θ into {0, 1}. We make the convention
that d(r) = 1 stands for the choice of depositing, and similarly w(r, d,Θ) = 1 means that
she will withdraw in period 1.12
A symmetric equilibrium is then r∗, d∗, and w∗ such that w∗(r, d,Θ) is optimal for all
(r, d,Θ), d∗(r) is optimal for all r, and r∗ is optimal taking as given agents’ strategies.
The bank fails in the first period if d∗(r∗) = 1 and 1 < r∗m/n where r∗ is an equilibrium
interest rate and m is the number of depositors that choose to withdraw (i.e., w∗(r∗, 1,Θ) =
1). That is, the total value of assets that depositors plan to withdraw in period 1 strictly
exceeds the total value of assets owned by the bank, also in period 1.
We say that an equilibrium bank failure occurs asymptotically with positive probability
if there exists N ∈ N such that n ≥ N implies the existence of a symmetric equilibrium
with the following properties: (1)every consumer deposits (i.e., d∗(r∗) = 1), (2) all patient
consumers wait (i.e., w∗(r∗, d∗(r∗), 2) = 0) and (3) the bank fails in the first period with
strictly positive probability.
In the above equilibrium there is a bank failure caused by large withdrawals in the sense
that a large number of depositors go to the bank, causing it to fail. However, since all
patient consumers prefer to wait, it follows that there is no consumers’ panic.
4 Equilibrium Bank Failures
In this section, we consider whether equilibrium bank failures caused by large withdrawals
exist and how robust they are. In Section 4.1, we give a sufficient condition that guarantees
the existence of equilibrium bank failures with positive probability in large economies. Then,
in Section 4.2, we show that under the same assumption, the probability of a bank failure
is bounded away from zero as the number of consumers increases.
11This implies that storage will only be helpful for patient consumers who withdraw early.
12Note that we allow only pure strategies. It is important to note that it is possible to have bank runs in
a mixed strategy equilibrium, as shown by Ada˜o and Temzelides [1].
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4.1 Existence of Equilibrium Bank Failures
In an equilibrium bank failure caused by large withdrawals, all consumers choose to deposit
and patient consumers prefer to wait. So, it is necessary to guarantee the existence of
equilibria with these properties, which one can do under the assumptions made in Section
2.
We can construct such an equilibrium by studying a particular maximization problem.
This problem consists of choosing an interest rate r in order to maximize consumers’ ex-ante
utility among those that make consumers prefer to deposit and patient consumers to wait,
given that everyone else is depositing and every other patient depositor is waiting.
We describe this problem below, which is indexed by the number of consumers. The
ex-ante expected utility if all follow the above strategy can be obtained as follows: if a con-
sumer is of type 1, he receives r with probability α(i, kn(r)) when the fraction of impatient
consumers is i and the bank can fully pay nkn(r) consumers. If the consumer is of type
2, he receives max{0, R(n−ri)n−i }. Thus, letting Un(r) denote the ex-ante expected utility, we
have
Un(r) =
∫ 1
0
f(t)
t ∑
i∈Sn−1
pn−1,t(i)α
(
(n− 1)i+ 1
n
, kn(r)
)
u(r)
+(1− t)
∑
i∈Sn−1
pn−1,t(i)u
(
max
{
0,
R(n− r(n− 1)i)
n− (n− 1)i
})dt.
(6)
In particular, suppose that the bank offers an interest rate equal to r, all consumers
deposit, and all patient consumers wait for the second period to withdraw. Then, the
expected utility for a patient consumer equals∫ 1
0
f(t)
∑
i∈Sn−1
pn−1,t(i)u
(
max
{
0,
R(n− r(n− 1)i)
n− (n− 1)i
})
dt. (7)
If one patient consumer decides to withdraw in period 1, then his expected utility, when all
the other patient consumers withdraw in period 2, is given by∫ 1
0
f(t)
∑
i∈Sn−1
pn−1,t(i)α
(
(n− 1)i+ 1
n
, kn(r)
)
u(r)dt. (8)
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Thus, lettingWn = {r ∈ [1, R] :WLn(r) ≥WRn(r)} , whereWLn(r) is defined by equation
(7) andWRn(r) by equation (8), we have that any patient consumer will choose to withdraw
in period 2 provided that r belongs to Wn, all consumers deposit, and all other patient
consumers wait for period 2 to withdraw.
If a consumer decides not to deposit, his ex-ante expected utility is simply∫ 1
0
f(t) [tu(1) + (1− t)u(R)] dt,
which is equal to Un(1). Hence, letting Dn = {r ∈ [1, R] : Un(r) ≥ Un(1)}, we see that any
consumer will choose to deposit provided that r belongs to Dn, all other consumers deposit,
and all patient consumers wait for period 2 to withdraw.
Thus, consider the following problem:
max
r∈[1,R]
Un(r)
subject to r ∈Wn ∩Dn,
(9)
One can show that this problem has a solution (see Lemma 11 in the Appendix). Using the
solution to this problem, it is then easy to construct an equilibrium in which all consumers
deposit and all patient consumers wait (see Lemma 12).
Although the existence of such equilibria is necessary for our purposes, it is not enough.
Without further assumptions, the interest rate offered by the bank in such equilibria may be
equal to one, in which case there will be no bank failure. Thus, we need additional assump-
tions in order to guarantee that bank failures occur with positive probability. Essentially,
we need the support of f to have values sufficiently close to one, and a large population.
Proposition 1 For every B > 0 and x ∈ (0, 1) there exists τ ∈ [0, 1] such that if τ <
t¯ < 1 and f ∈ Ft¯,B,x then an equilibrium bank failure occurs asymptotically with positive
probability.
One important element needed for Proposition 1 is a large population. By the law
of large numbers, the fraction of impatient consumers in the population converges to the
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probability of each consumer being impatient as the size of the population increases. This
implies that in the limit there is only one source of aggregate uncertainty, which is the one
represented by f . This is in contrast to what happens in any finite economy, where some
aggregate uncertainty stems from the consumers’ idiosyncratic preference shocks. This is
important partly because the probability that the fraction of impatient consumers is between
t¯ and 1 is always positive in any finite economy, but is zero in the limit.
The above comment suggests that the analysis of a limit problem where the law of large
numbers holds might be useful and easier. In the Appendix A.1 we show that problem (9)
converges, in the sense that all the functions involved converge uniformly, to the following
problem:
max
r∈[1,R]
U(r) =
∫ 1
0
f(t)
[
tα(t, k(r))u(r) + (1− t)u
(
max
{
0,
R(1− rt)
1− t
})]
dt
subject to r ∈W ∩D,
(10)
where k(r) = 1/r, D = {r ∈ [1, R] : U(r) ≥ U(1)} and
W =
{
r ∈ [1, R] :
∫ 1
0
f(t)u
(
max
{
0,
R(1− rt)
1− t
})
dt ≥
∫ 1
0
f(t)α(t, k(r))u(r)dt
}
. (11)
In this problem, the variable t can be thought of as the fraction of impatient consumers
in the population. In this way, it is very similar to the one considered initially by Diamond
and Dybvig [8].
The analysis of the limit problem above reveals that its solution exceeds r¯ = 1/t¯, pro-
vided that t¯ is sufficiently close to 1. This allows us to conclude that the solution to problem
(9) is also greater than r¯ if the population is large enough, leading directly to a positive
probability of a bank failure. This reasoning illustrates why we need the support of f to
have values sufficiently close to one.
4.2 A Limit Result on the Probability of Bank Failures
As we have pointed out above, there are two sources of aggregate uncertainty in a finite
economy. This implies that there are two reasons for having a positive probability of bank
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failure due to large withdrawals whenever the bank offers an interest rate greater than
1. First, for any possible t > 0, the probability that the fraction of impatient consumers
is greater than 1/r is always positive — this probability has to do with the distribution
associated with pn,t. A second reason has to do with the distribution associated with f ,
which can also (by the law of large numbers) be thought of as representing the probability
that the fraction of impatient consumers is greater than 1/r.
Clearly, the second effect alluded to above can only take place if r exceeds r¯. If this is
not the case, then the probability of a bank failure is essentially due only to the consumers’
idiosyncratic shocks, and would vanish as the population size increases. What Proposition
2 below shows is that this is not the case: in fact, it shows that part of a positive probability
of bank failures comes from the desire to provide a better risk sharing, which is expressed
in an interest rate greater and bounded away from r¯.
We now turn to Proposition 2. Under the conditions of Proposition 1, we know that
asymptotically there exist equilibrium bank failures. For every n sufficiently large, let
(r∗n, d∗n, w∗n) be an equilibrium in which there is a bank run without consumers’ panic. Let
γn be the corresponding probability of a bank run.
Proposition 2 The sequence {γn}n is bounded away from 0.
Proposition 2 shows that no matter how large the economy is, and thus no matter
how well the idiosyncratic risk is diversified, the probability of a bank failure never goes
below a certain value. This implies that an economy can experience a bank failure due to
large withdrawals even if no consumer panics, since these bank failures have a fundamental
nature: they occur when the average fraction of impatient consumers is high, i.e., when
there are many people who need liquidity.
At this point we can provide an easy illustration of why it is necessary that the support
of f has values sufficiently close to one: if R = 2 and t¯ = 1/3, then r¯ = 1/t¯ = 3 > R. Thus,
an upper bound for γn is obtained when the bank offers rn = R for all n, which we denote
by γ˜n. It follows easily from the law of large numbers that in this case γ˜n converges to zero.
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Thus, we need r¯ to be large.
5 Concluding Remarks
We used the standard Diamond and Dybvig [8] framework to show that bank failures caused
by large withdrawals can be explained as the result of illiquid banks and illiquid consumers,
without many of the elements emphasized in the literature. In our version of the Diamond
and Dybvig framework, such bank failures will occur whenever there is a large number of
depositors in need of short-term funds. These are possible because banks will choose to offer
a high short-term interest rate in order to provide better risk sharing for their depositors;
however, the interest rate offered is sufficiently high to lead to a positive probability that
the bank will not have enough funds to pay all early withdrawers. Hence, bank failures
of this type are a direct consequence of the degree of banks’ liquidity. Furthermore, our
construction is such that the probability of a bank run is sufficiently small to guarantee
that those who do not need funds early will prefer not to withdraw early. We thus depart
from the idea that in an extreme withdrawing episode some depositors withdraw when they
do not need to — this is the sense in which such episodes should not be regarded as bank
runs.
The type of equilibria on which we concentrate reflects some practical features of the
banking system: banks offer liquidity and risk sharing to depositors, people deposit and
withdraw only when they have to, and sometimes banks fail. Furthermore, an equilibrium
of this type has the property of having no consumer panic, and still bank failures occur
with a positive, bounded away from zero, probability.
Although not explicitly modeled, we may interpret the aggregate uncertainty over the
number of early withdrawers as reflecting business cycle conditions. For instance, we expect
the number of people who need short-term funding to be influenced by the unemployment
rate — this will be the case as long as unemployed individuals try to compensate the loss of
income by using their assets to smooth out consumption. We then expect that fundamental
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shocks that lead to a large number of early withdrawers can lead to extreme withdrawals.
Therefore, our results are consistent with the business cycle view of bank crises, a view
that has received some empirical support (see Gorton [12], Kaminsky and Reinhart [15] and
Calomiris and Mason [6]). This suggests that explicitly introducing the type of fundamental
shocks studied in the business cycle literature might be promising, a challenge we take up
in Amaral and Carmona [3].
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A Appendix
In this appendix, we will prove our results. In Section A.1, and following Hildenbrand [16],
we will start by showing that problem (9) converges to the type of problem studied by
Diamond and Dybvig [8] as the number of consumers goes to infinity. Although we are
interested in finite economies, the latter problem is interesting because it is easy to study.
This is essentially because the law of large numbers holds.
In Section A.2, we study the limit problem. The main result there (Lemma 7) shows
that the interest rate offered by the bank is sufficiently high to allow for bank failures due
to large withdrawals in the limit problem under certain conditions.13 The main difficulty
regarding this result has to do with the possibility that the marginal utility of consumption
is not bounded from above; therefore, much of the effort is devoted to showing that standard
limit results, such as the Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem is still applicable.
In Section A.3, we show that for every n ∈ N (n denotes the population size) there exists
an equilibrium in which all consumers deposit at the bank and all patient consumers wait
to withdraw. Finally, and under the same conditions as in Lemma 7, we show in Section
A.4 that there is a positive probability of an equilibrium bank run in large finite economies;
furthermore, we show in Section A.5 that such a probability of an equilibrium bank run
remains bounded away from zero as the number of consumers increases.
A.1 The Limit Problem
Lemma 1 For any continuous function h : [α, β]× [a, b]→ R, with [a, b] ⊆ [0, 1],∫
[a,b]
h(r, i)dpn,t(i)→ h(r, t)
uniformly in r and t.
Proof. Let ε > 0. Since h is continuous in [α, β]× [a, b], a compact set, h is bounded.
Let B > ε be such that |h| ≤ B and let δ > 0 be such that |x − y| < δ implies that
13For an illustration of the idea of Lemma 7, see the last column of Table 1 in Ennis and Keister [9].
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|h(x)−h(y)| < ε/2. Then, since pn,t(Bδ(t)) ≥ 1− t(1−t)nδ2 (see Freund [10, p. 190]), it follows
that ∣∣∣∣∣
∫
[a,b]
h(r, i)dpn,t(i)− h(r, t)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Bδ(t)
hdpn,t − pn,t(Bδ(t))h(r, t)
∣∣∣∣∣+∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Bcδ(t)
hdpn,t − pn,t(Bcδ(t))h(r, t)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ pn,t(Bδ(t))ε2 + pn,t(Bcδ(t))2B ≤(
1− t(1− t)
nδ2
)
ε
2
+
t(1− t)
nδ2
2B ≤
(
1− 1
4nδ2
)
ε
2
+
1
4nδ2
2B < ε,
(12)
if n is sufficiently large. Thus, sup(r,t) |
∫
[a,b] h(r, i)dpn,t(i) − h(r, t)| ≤ ε for n sufficiently
large, which completes the proof.
Lemma 2 Let h and hn, for all n ∈ N, be real-valued functions on [α, β] × [a, b], with
[a, b] ⊆ [0, 1], satisfying h is continuous and hn converges uniformly to h. Then,∫
[a,b]
hn(r, i)dpn,t(i)→ h(r, t)
uniformly on r and t.
Proof. Let ε > 0. Then, since∣∣∣∣∣
∫
[a,b]
hn(r, i)dpn,t(i)−
∫
[a,b]
h(r, i)dpn,t(i)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∫
[a,b]
|hn − h|dpn,t ≤ sup
(r,i)
|hn(r, i)− h(r, i)|,
(13)
it follows by lemma 1 that∣∣∣∣∣
∫
[a,b]
hn(r, i)dpn,t(i)− h(r, t)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
[a,b]
hn(r, i)dpn,t(i)−
∫
[a,b]
h(r, i)dpn,t(i)
∣∣∣∣∣+∣∣∣∣∣
∫
[a,b]
h(r, i)dpn,t(i)− h(r, t)
∣∣∣∣∣ < ε,
(14)
if n is sufficiently large. Thus, sup(r,t) |
∫
[a,b] hn(r, i)dpn,t(i) − h(r, t)| ≤ ε for n sufficiently
large, which completes the proof.
Define, for t, i ∈ [0, 1],
V 1n (r, i) = α
(
i+
1− i
n
, kn(r)
)
u(r), (15)
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and
V 2n (r, i) = u
(
max
{
0,
R
(
1− r (1− 1n) i)
1− (1− 1n) i
})
. (16)
Also let k(r) = 1/r,
V 1(r, i) = α(i, k(r))u(r), (17)
and
V 2(r, i) = u
(
max
{
0,
R(1− ri)
1− i
})
. (18)
Lemma 3 1. kn(r) converges to k(r) uniformly;
2. α(i+ (1− i)/n, kn(r)) converges to α(i, k(r)) uniformly in i ∈ [0, 1] and r ∈ [1, R];
3. tV 1n (r, i)+(1−t)V 2n (r, i) converges uniformly to tV 1(r, i)+(1−t)V 2(r, i) in i ∈ [0, 1−ε]
and r ∈ [1, R] for all ε > 0;
4. (r, i) 7→ tV 1(r, i) + (1 − t)V 2(r, i) is continuous when i ∈ [0, 1 − ε] and r ∈ [1, R] for
all ε > 0 and t ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. 1. We have that
k(r)− 1
n
≤ kn(r) ≤ k(r), (19)
which implies that |kn(r)−k(r)| ≤ 1/n and so, kn(r) converges uniformly to k(r). Equation
(19) can be established as follows: if kn(r) > k(r), then rkn(r) > rk(r) = 1, a contradiction;
if kn(r) < k(r)− 1/n, then r(kn(r) + 1/n) < rk(r) = 1, a contradiction.
2. We start by noting the following fact: if (r, i) 7→ an(r, i) converges uniformly (in i
and r) to (r, i) 7→ a(r, i), (r, i) 7→ bn(r, i) converges uniformly to (r, i) 7→ b(r, i), both a and
b are bounded and b and bn are bounded away from zero (i.e., there is η > 0 such that
b(r, i) ≥ η and bn(r, i) ≥ η for all (r, i) and all n), then an/bn converges uniformly to a/b.
Suppose that i ≥ 1/r. Then α(i, k(r)) = 1/(ri) and since k(r) ≥ kn(r) and i+(1−i)/n ≥
i, it follows that α(i+(1− i)/n, kn(r)) = kn(r)/(i+(1− i)/n). In order to apply the above
fact, let an(r, i) = kn(r), a(r, i) = 1/r, bn(r, i) = i + (1 − i)/n and b(r, i) = i. Since
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all the conditions are satisfied (in particular, bn(r, i) ≥ b(r, i) ≥ 1/R), it follows that
sup(r,i):ri≥1 |α(i+ (1− i)/n, kn(r))− α(i, k(r))| converges to zero.
Finally, suppose that i < 1/r. Then, k(r) = 1 and so
|α(i+ (1− i)/n, kn(r))− α(i, k(r))| = 1−min
{
1,
kn(r)
i+ 1−in
}
≤
1− kn(r)
1 + 1/n
≤ 1− k(r)− 1/n
1 + 1/n
= 1− 1− 1/n
1 + 1/n
.
(20)
Thus, sup(r,i):ri<1 |α(i + (1 − i)/n, kn(r)) − α(i, k(r))| → 0. Hence, α(i + (1 − i)/n, kn(r))
converges to α(i, k(r)) uniformly in r and i.
3. It follows from part 2 that V 1n (r, i) converges uniformly to V
1(r, i).
It remains to show that V 2n (r, i) converges uniformly to V
2(r, i) if r ∈ [1, R] and i ∈
[0, 1− ε], with ε > 0. Define
βn(r, i) = max
{
0,
R(1− r(1− 1n)i)
1− (1− 1n)i
}
and
β(r, i) = max
{
0,
R(1− ri)
1− i
}
.
Since βn(1, i) = β(1, i) = R, we may assume that r > 1. Note also that βn(r, i) ≥ β(r, i).
If i ≤ 1/r then β(r, i) ≥ 0, and we readily see that all the conditions of the fact in part 2
of this proof are satisfied: let a(r, i) = R(1−ri), an(r, i) = R(1− ri(1−1/n)), b(r, i) = 1− i
and bn(r, i) = 1− i(1− 1/n); in particular bn ≥ b ≥ ε.
If i > 1/r, then β(r, i) = 0 and since βn(r, i) is decreasing in i, we obtain
|βn(r, i)− β(r, i)| ≤
R(1− r(1− 1n)1r )
1− (1− 1n)1r
= R
1/n
1− 1/r + 1/(rn)
≤ R 1/n
1− 1/r ≤
R
εn
→ 0.
(21)
Thus, βn(r, i) converges uniformly to β(r, i). Since u is continuous, then V 2n (r, i) converges
uniformly to V 2(r, i).
4. Obvious.
Let
U(r) =
∫ 1
0
f(t)
[
tα(t, k(r))u(r) + (1− t)u
(
max
{
0,
R(1− rt)
1− t
})]
dt, (22)
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and k(r) = 1/r.
Lemma 4 Let B > 0, x ∈ (0, 1), 0 < t¯ < 1 and f ∈ Ft¯,B,x. Then, Un(r) converges
uniformly to U(r).
Proof. We may write Un(r) =
∫ t¯
0 f(t)Vn(r, t)dt, where
Vn(r, t) =
∫ 1
0
(
tV 1n (r, i) + (1− t)V 2n (r, i)
)
dpn−1,t(i).
We may also define
V (r, t) = tα(t, k(r))u(r) + (1− t)u
(
max
{
0,
R(1− rt)
1− t
})
and write U(r) =
∫ t¯
0 f(t)V (r, t)dt. Thus, in order to prove the lemma, it is enough to show
that Vn converges uniformly to V for r ∈ [1, R] and t ∈ [0, t¯].
Let 0 < η < 1− t¯. Then,
|Vn(r, t)− V (r, t)| ≤
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ t¯+η
0
Vn(r, i)dpn−1,t(i)− V (r, t)
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∫ 1
t¯+η
Vn(r, i)dpn−1,t(i)
∣∣∣∣ . (23)
Since pn−1,t(Bη(t)) ≥ 1− t(1−t)(n−1)η2 (see Freund [10, p. 190]), we have that∣∣∣∣∫ 1
t¯+η
Vn(r, i)dpn−1,t(i)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ u(R)pn−1,t([t¯+ η, 1]) ≤
u(R)pn−1,t([0, t− η] ∪ [t+ η, 1]) ≤ u(R) t(1− t)(n− 1)η2 ≤ u(R)
1
4(n− 1)η2 .
(24)
Since u(R)/[4(n− 1)η2] converges to zero and is independent of r and t, it remains to show
that ∣∣∣∣∣
∫ t¯+η
0
Vn(r, i)dpn−1,t(i)− V (r, t)
∣∣∣∣∣
converges to zero uniformly. This follows from Lemma 2 and 3.
Let
WL(r) =
∫ 1
0
f(t)u
(
max
{
0,
R(1− rt)
1− t
})
dt (25)
and
WR(r) =
∫ 1
0
f(t)α(t, k(r))u(r)dt. (26)
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Lemma 5 Let B > 0, x ∈ (0, 1), 0 < t¯ < 1 and f ∈ Ft¯,B,x. Then, WLn(r) converges
uniformly to WL(r) and WRn(r) converges uniformly to WR(r).
Proof. Analogous to Lemma 4.
A.2 Analysis of the Limit Problem
Let D = {r ∈ [1, R] : U(r) ≥ U(1)} and W = {r ∈ [1, R] :WL(r) ≥WR(r)}.
Lemma 6 The function U has a maximizer in D ∩W .
Proof. Note that the set D ∩W is compact, and non-empty, since r = 1 belongs to
D∩W . The function U is a continuous function of r. Hence, there exists r∗ that maximizes
U in D ∩W .
Lemma 7 For all B > 0 and x ∈ (0, 1), there is τ ∈ [0, 1] such that if τ < t¯ < 1 and
f ∈ Ft¯,B,x the following holds:
There exists r˜ > 1/t¯ such that U(r˜) > U(r) for all 1 ≤ r ≤ 1/t¯ and WL(r˜) > WR(r˜).
Lemma 7 is the key lemma to establish Proposition 1. Before presenting its proof, we
need some technical lemmas.
Lemma 8
∫ r
0 u
′ = u(r) for any r > 0.
Proof. Let 0 < δ < r. Then
∫ r
δ u
′ = u(r) − u(δ) (see Wheeden and Zygmund [24,
Theorem 5.52, p.83] and Rudin [21, Theorem 6.21, p. 134]).
Define hk = χ[1/k,r]u′ for all k ∈ N. Since hk ≥ 0 for all k, and hk ↗ u′, it follows that∫ r
0 hk →
∫ r
0 u
′. Hence,
∫ r
0 u
′ = limk[u(r)− u(1/k)] = u(r)− u(0) = u(r).
Let g(r, t) = R(1−rt)1−t .
Lemma 9 If r > 1 and 0 ≤ c < d ≤ 1/r, then∫ d
c
u′(g(r, t))dt =
∫ R(1−rc)
1−c
R(1−rd)
1−d
u′(y)
R(r − 1)
(Rr − y)2dy.
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Proof. We start by noting the following extension of the change of variable theorem
(Rudin [21, Theorem 6.19, p. 132]): if γ : [A,B]→ [b, a] is a strictly decreasing continuous
function with γ′ Riemann integrable and h is Riemann integrable on [b, a], then
∫ a
b h(x)dx =∫ B
A (−γ′(y))h(γ(y))dy.
Assume first that d < 1/r. Let γ(y) = R−yRr−y . Letting gr(t) = g(r, t), we see that γ = g
−1
r .
Then −γ′(y) = R(r−1)
(Rr−y)2 , and is therefore bounded by 1/R(r − 1) (since y ≤ R). Thus, by
the above, ∫ d
c
u′ ◦ g(r, t)dt =
∫ d
c
u′ ◦ gr(t)dt =
∫ R(1−rc)
1−c
R(1−rd)
1−d
u′(y)
R(r − 1)
(Rr − y)2dy. (27)
If d = 1/r, using a limit argument similar to that in Lemma 8, we can show that∫ 1/r
c
u′(g(r, t))dt = lim
δ→1/r
∫ δ
c
u′(g(r, t))dt =
∫ R(1−rc)
1−c
0
u′(y)
R(r − 1)
(Rr − y)2dy. (28)
We can now proceed with the proof of Lemma 7.
Proof of Lemma 7. Since WL(1) = u(R) > u(1) = WR(1), then there exists ζ > 0
such that 1 < r < 1 + ζ implies WL(r) > WR(r).
Let f be such that
∫ 1
0 tf(t)dt = x. Consider the following function M : [0, 1] → R
defined by
M(r) =
∫ 1
0
[u′(r)−Ru′(g(r, t))]tf(t)dt. (29)
Clearly, M(1) = [u′(1) − Ru′(R)] ∫ 10 tf(t)dt = [u′(1) − Ru′(R)]x and so M(1) > 0 (see
Diamond and Dybvig [8, footnote 2]).
Let {t¯k}k ⊂ (0, 1) be such that limk t¯k = 1 and {fk} be a sequence of densities belonging
to Ft¯k,B,x, but otherwise arbitrary. Let r¯k = 1/t¯k, for all k.
Claim 1 limk
∫ 1
0 [u
′(r¯k)−Ru′(g(r¯k, t))]tfk(t)dt = [u′(1)−Ru′(R)]x.
Proof. Since u′ is continuous, we have that u′(r¯k)x→ u′(1)x; thus, it remains to show
that
∫ 1
0 u
′ ◦ g(r¯k, t)tfk(t)dt → xu′(R). Note that xu′(R) =
∫ 1
0 u
′ ◦ g(1, t)tfk(t)dt for all k.
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We have that u′ ◦ g(r¯k, t) ≥ u′(R) = u′ ◦ g(1, t) for all t ∈ [0, t¯k] and so∣∣∣∣∫ 1
0
u′ ◦ g(r¯k, t)tfk(t)dt−
∫ 1
0
u′ ◦ g(1, t)tfk(t)dt
∣∣∣∣
≤ B
∫ 1
0
(u′ ◦ g(r¯k, t)− u′ ◦ g(1, t))χ[0,t¯k]dt.
(30)
Since
∫ 1
0 u
′ ◦ g(1, t)χ[0,t¯k]dt→ u′(R) =
∫ 1
0 u
′ ◦ g(1, t)dt, it is enough to show that∫ t¯k
0
u′ ◦ g(r¯k, t)dt =
∫ 1
0
u′ ◦ g(r¯k, t)χ[0,t¯k]dt→
∫ 1
0
u′ ◦ g(1, t)dt.
Clearly, 0 ≤ u′ ◦ g(r¯k, t)χ[0,t¯k] → u′ ◦ g(1, t) for all t < 1. Let ε > 0. Then, by
the bounded convergence theorem (Wheeden and Zygmund [24, Corollary 5.37, p. 76])∫ 1−ε
0 u
′ ◦ g(r¯k, t)dt→ u′(R)(1− ε). By Lemma 9, for k large,∫ 1
1−ε
u′ ◦ g(r¯k, t)χ[0,t¯k]dt =
∫ t¯k
1−ε
u′ ◦ g(r¯k, t)dt =
∫ R(1−r¯k+εr¯k)/ε
0
u′(y)
R(r¯k − 1)
(Rr¯k − y)2dy. (31)
We have that∫ R(1−r¯k+εr¯k)/ε
0
u′(y)
R(r¯k − 1)
(Rr¯k − y)2dy =∫ 1
0
u′(y)
R(r¯k − 1)
(Rr¯k − y)2dy +
∫ R(1−r¯k+εr¯k)/ε
1
u′(y)
R(r¯k − 1)
(Rr¯k − y)2dy ≤
R(r¯k − 1)
(Rr¯k − 1)2
∫ 1
0
u′(y)dy + u′(1)R(r¯k − 1)
∫ R(1−r¯k+εr¯k)/ε
1
1
(Rr¯k − y)2dy =
u(1)
R(r¯k − 1)
(Rr¯k − 1)2 + u
′(1)
[
R(r¯k − 1)
Rr¯k −R(1− r¯k + εr¯k)/ε −
R(r¯k − 1)
Rr¯k − 1
]
=
u(1)
R(r¯k − 1)
(Rr¯k − 1)2 + u
′(1)
[
ε− R(r¯k − 1)
Rr¯k − 1
]
→ εu′(1).
(32)
Thus,
u′(R) ≤ lim inf
k
∫ t¯k
0
u′ ◦ g(r¯k, t)dt ≤ lim sup
k
∫ t¯k
0
u′ ◦ g(r¯k, t)dt ≤ εu′(1)+ (1− ε)u′(R), (33)
and so limk
∫ t¯k
0 u
′ ◦ g(r¯k, t)dt = u′(R).
Hence, it follows from claim 1 that there exists 0 < τ < 1 such that if τ < t¯ < 1 and
f ∈ Ft¯,B,x, then Mf (r¯) > 0. Furthermore, we can choose τ so that and WL(r) > WR(r)
for all r ∈ [1, r¯].
Let t¯ ∈ (τ, 1) and f ∈ Ft¯,B,x. Note that U is concave in [0, r¯], where r¯ = 1/t¯ as before.
This follows from the fact that both u and r 7→ u ◦ g(r, t) are concave for all t ∈ [0, r¯]: we
have that ∂2u ◦ g(r, t)/∂r2 = u′′ ◦ g(r, t)(tR)2/(1− t)2 < 0.
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Claim 2 U ′(r) =M(r) for all r ∈ [1, r¯].
Proof. Let r ∈ (1, r¯] and let rk ↗ r. Then
U(rk)− U(r)
rk − r =
∫ t¯
0
f(t)
[
t
u(rk)− u(r)
rk − r + (1− t)
u ◦ g(rk, t)− u ◦ g(r, t)
rk − r
]
dt. (34)
So, it is enough to show that∫ t¯
0
f(t)t
u(rk)− u(r)
rk − r dt→
∫ t¯
0
f(t)u′(r)dt,
and ∫ t¯
0
f(t)(1− t)u ◦ g(rk, t)− u ◦ g(r, t)
rk − r dt→
∫ t¯
0
f(t)tRu′ ◦ g(r, t)dt.
We have that {(u(rk) − u(r))/(rk − r)}k is non-negative and decreasing and that t 7→
tf(t)(u(r1) − u(r))/(r1 − r) is integrable. The desired convergence then follows from the
monotone convergence theorem (see Wheeden and Zygmung [24, Theorem 5.32, p. 75]).
Similarly, {(u◦ g(rk, t)−u◦ g(r, t))/(rk− r)}k is non-positive and decreasing, and so {−(u◦
g(rk, t)−u◦g(r, t))/(rk−r)}k is non-negative and increasing, and so the desired convergence
follows also from the monotone convergence theorem.
The case r ∈ [1, r¯) and rk ↘ r is analogous.
Since U is concave, thenM is decreasing. This implies that U(r¯) ≥ U(r) for all 1 ≤ r ≤ r¯
as follows: A necessary condition for a solution to the problem
max
r∈[1,R]
U(r)
subject to r ∈W ∩D and r ≤ r¯.
(35)
is that [r− r¯]M(r) = 0. SinceM(r) ≥M(r¯) > 0 for all r ∈ [1, r¯], it follows that r¯ maximizes
U(r) in [1, r¯].
Finally, we claim that there exists r˜ > r¯ such that U(r˜) > U(r¯) and WL(r˜) > WR(r˜).
Since WL(r¯) > WR(r¯), we conclude that there exists a ball B(r¯) around r¯ such that
r ∈ B(r¯) implies WL(r) > WR(r). Therefore, to prove the existence of r˜ with the above
properties, it is enough to show that
lim inf
r↘r¯
U(r)− U(r¯)
r − r¯ > 0. (36)
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This is so, because if equation (36) holds, then it cannot be the case that U(r)−U(r¯)r−r¯ ≤ 0 for
all r > r¯ in the ball B(r¯) around r¯. This implies the existence of r˜ > r¯ in B(r¯) such that
U(r˜)−U(r¯)
r˜−r¯ > 0; this, of course, implies that U(r˜) > U(r¯).
We have that
U(r)− U(r¯)
r − r¯ =
∫ 1/r
0
[
t
u(r)− u(r¯)
r − r¯ + (1− t)
u ◦ g(r, t)− u ◦ g(r¯, t)
r − r¯
]
f(t)dt+
1
r − r¯
∫ t¯
1/r
{t[α(t, k(r))u(r)− u(r¯)]− (1− t)u ◦ g(r¯, t)}f(t)dt.
(37)
Let {rk}k be such that rk ↘ r¯. Note that α(t, k(rk)) = 1/(trk) = tk/t, with tk = 1/rk.
Let ε > 0; if k ∈ N is sufficiently large, then we have that |tku(rk) − tu(r¯)| < ε for all
t ∈ [tk, t¯] since
|tku(rk)− tu(r¯)| ≤ tk|u(rk)− u(r¯)|+ u(r¯)|tk − t|
≤ t¯|u(rk)− u(r¯)|+ u(r¯)|tk − t¯|,
(38)
and tk → t¯. Therefore,∣∣∣∣∣ 1rk − r¯
∫ t¯
1/rk
t[α(t, k(rk))u(rk)− u(r¯)]f(t)dt
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣ 1rk − r¯
∫ 1/r¯
1/rk
[tku(rk)− tu(r¯)]f(t)dt
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
ε
rk − r¯
∫ 1/r¯
1/rk
f(t)dt = ε
F (1/r¯)− F (1/rk)
rk − r¯ → ε
f(1/r¯)
r¯2
.
(39)
Since ε is arbitrary, then
lim
k
1
rk − r¯
∫ t¯
1/rk
{t[α(t, k(r))u(r)− u(r¯)]f(t)dt = 0. (40)
Also, by the fundamental theorem of calculus,
1
rk − r¯
∫ 1/r¯
1/rk
(1− t)f(t)u ◦ g(r¯, t)dt→ (1− t¯)f(t¯)u ◦ g(r¯, t¯)/r¯2 = 0, (41)
since g(r¯, t¯) = 0 and u(0) = 0. Hence, it remains to show that
lim inf
r↘r¯
∫ 1/r
0
[
t
u(r)− u(r¯)
r − r¯ + (1− t)
u ◦ g(r, t)− u ◦ g(r¯, t)
r − r¯
]
f(t)dt > 0. (42)
Define
hk(t) =

[
tu(rk)−u(r¯)rk−r¯ + (1− t)
u◦g(rk,t)−u◦g(r¯,t)
rk−r¯
]
f(t) if t ∈ [0, 1/rk]
0 otherwise,
(43)
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Also, let
h1k = t
u(rk)− u(r¯)
rk − r¯ χ[0,1/rk]
and
h2k = (1− t)
u ◦ g(rk, t)− u ◦ g(r¯, t)
rk − r¯ χ[0,1/rk].
Clearly,
∫ 1/r¯
0 h
1
k →
∫ 1/r¯
0 u
′(r¯)tf(t)dt. Also, for all ε > 0,
∫ 1/r¯
0 h
2
k =
∫ 1/r¯−ε
0 h
2
k +
∫ 1/r¯
1/r¯−ε h
2
k
and
∫ 1/r¯−ε
0 h
2
k → −
∫ 1/r¯−ε
0 Ru
′ ◦ g(r¯, t)tf(t)dt, since h2k is bounded in [0, t¯− ε].
Consider
∫ 1/r¯
1/r¯−ε h
2
k. We have that∫ 1/r¯
1/r¯−ε
h2k =
∫ 1/rk
1/r¯−ε
(1− t)u ◦ g(rk, t)− u ◦ g(r¯, t)
rk − r¯ f(t)dt ≥
B
∫ 1/rk
1/r¯−ε
(1− t)u ◦ g(rk, t)− u ◦ g(r¯, t)
rk − r¯ dt = −B
∫ 1/rk
1/r¯−ε
(1− t)u′ ◦ g(ck,t, t) tR1− tdt ≥
−BR
∫ 1/rk
1/r¯−ε
u′ ◦ g(ck,t, t)dt ≥ −BR
∫ 1/rk
1/r¯−ε
u′ ◦ g(rk, t)dt,
(44)
where the first inequality uses the fact that 0 ≤ f ≤ B and u ◦ g(rk, t) < u ◦ g(r¯, t), the
second uses the mean value theorem, and so r¯ ≤ ck,t ≤ rk, and the last uses the fact that
u′ ◦ g is increasing and ck,t ≤ rk.
Choose ε > 0 such that (Rr¯ε)/(1− t¯+ ε) < 1. Then, for k large, (R(1− rk(t¯− ε)))/(1−
t¯+ ε) < 1, since r¯t¯ = 1. By Lemma 9, it follows that∫ 1/r¯
1/r¯−ε
h2k ≥ −BR
∫ R(1−rk(t¯−ε))
1−t¯+ε
0
u′(y)
R(rk − 1)
(Rrk − y)2dy
≥ −BR R(rk − 1)
(Rrk − 1)2
∫ R(1−rk(t¯−ε))
1−t¯+ε
0
u′(y)dy = −Kku
(
R(1− rk(t¯− ε))
1− t¯+ ε
)
,
(45)
where Kk = BR
R(rk−1)
(Rrk−1)2 . Note that the last equality follows from Lemma 8.
Hence, it follows that
lim inf
k
∫ 1/rk
0
hk ≥
∫ 1/r¯−ε
0
[u′(r¯)−Ru′ ◦ g(r¯, t)]tf(t)dt
+
∫ 1/r¯
1/r¯−ε
u′(r¯)tf(t)dt−BR R(r¯ − 1)
(Rr¯ − 1)2u
(
Rr¯ε
1− t¯+ ε
)
.
(46)
Since
∫ 1/r¯
0 [u
′(r¯)−Ru′◦g(r¯, t)]tf(t)dt =M(r¯) > 0, it follows in particular that 0 ≤ ∫ 1/r¯0 Ru′◦
g(r¯, t)tf(t)dt <∞. Thus,
lim
ε→0
∫ 1/r¯−ε
0
Ru′ ◦ g(r¯, t)tf(t)dt =
∫ 1/r¯
0
Ru′ ◦ g(r¯, t)tf(t)dt,
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and so
lim
ε→0
∫ 1/r¯−ε
0
[u′(r¯)−Ru′ ◦ g(r¯, t)]tf(t)dt =
∫ 1/r¯
0
[u′(r¯)−Ru′ ◦ g(r¯, t)]tf(t)dt.
Since limε→0 u ((Rr¯ε)/(1− t¯+ ε)) = 0, it follows that
lim inf
k
∫ 1/rk
0
hk ≥
∫ 1/r¯
0
[u′(r¯)−Ru′ ◦ g(r¯, t)]tf(t)dt =M(r¯) > 0. (47)
This completes the proof.
A.3 Existence of a Non-Autarkic Equilibrium with a Finite Number of
Consumers
In this section we establish the existence of an equilibrium in which all consumers deposit
at the bank.
Lemma 10 For any n, Un is upper semi-continuous.
Proof. Note that
kn(r) =

1 if r = 1
n−j
n if
n
n−j+1 < r ≤ nn−j , j = 1, . . . , n− 1
0 if r > n
(48)
Thus, kn is upper semi-continuous, and so is Un.
Lemma 11 The program
max
r∈[1,R]
Un(r)
subject to r ∈Wn ∩Dn,
(49)
has a solution.
Proof. Let Ij = [ nn−j+1 ,
n
n−j ] for j = 1, . . . , n− 1, In = [n,∞) and I0 = {1}. For each
j = 0, . . . , n, consider the following problem, denoted P j :
max
r
U jn(r) = EtEi
[
n− j
(n− 1)i+ 1u(r) + (1− t)u
(
max
{
R(n− r(n− 1)i
n− (n− 1)i
})]
subject to r ∈ Ij ∩W jn ∩Dn,
(50)
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where
W jn = {r ∈ [1, R] :WL(r) ≥
n− j
(n− 1)i+ 1u(r)}, (51)
for j = 1, . . . , n and W 0n = Wn. Let S be the set of those js for which the constraint set is
non-empty; the set S is non-empty since 1 ∈ I1∩W 0n ∩Dn and so 0 ∈ S. Then, if j ∈ S, the
above problem has a solution, since the objective function is upper semi-continuous, and
the constraint set is compact. Let r∗j be a solution to P
j .
Since Un jumps down if (and only if) r ∈ {1, nn−1 , nn−2 , . . . , n}, it follows that if nn−j is a
solution to P j , for some j > 0, then U j−1n (r∗j−1) ≥ U j−1n ( nn−j ) = Un( nn−j ) > U jn( nn−j ). Thus,
in order to find a maximum in [1, R] we can concentrate on those js for which nn−j is not a
solution to P j ; let J be such a set. Let r∗ be a solution to maxr∈{r∗j :j∈J} Un(r).
We claim that r∗ solves the problem (49). Letting I˜j = ( nn−j+1 ,
n
n−j ] for j = 1, . . . , n−1,
I˜n = (n,∞) and I˜0 = {1}, we can separate it into the following problems, denoted P˜ j :
max
r
U jn(r) = EtEi
[
n− j
(n− 1)i+ 1u(r) + (1− t)u
(
max
{
R(n− r(n− 1)i
n− (n− 1)i
})]
subject to r ∈ I˜j ∩W jn ∩Dn.
(52)
Since for j ∈ J the solution does not involve nn−j , P˜ j has the same solutions as P j . Hence,
r∗ is a solution to program (49).
Lemma 12 For all n, there is a symmetric equilibrium in which all consumers deposit.
Proof. The strategies are: the bank offers r∗, and the consumers choose d∗(r) = 1 if
r ∈ Dn ∩Wn and 0 otherwise, w∗(r, d, 2) = 0 if r ∈ Dn ∩Wn and d = 1 and 1 otherwise,
and w∗(r, d, 1) = 1 for all (r, d).
A.4 A Positive Probability of an Equilibrium Bank Run
In this section we prove Proposition 1. By Lemma 12, there is an equilibrium in which all
consumers deposit for all n ∈ N and all functions f .
Let τ be as in Lemma 7 and let t¯ > τ and f ∈ Ft¯. Then, there is r˜ > 1/t¯ such that
U(r˜) > U(r) for all r ∈ [1, 1/t¯] and WL(r˜) > WR(r˜). Then, by Lemmas 4 and 5, it follows
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that Un(r˜) > Un(r) for all r ∈ [1, 1/t¯] and WLn(r˜) > WRn(r˜) if n is large. Thus, r∗n > 1/t¯.
Hence, the bank fails with a probability given by
∫ t¯
0
f(t)
 ∑
i∈Sn:i>1/r∗n
pn,t(i)
dt > 0, (53)
since
∑
i∈Sn:i>1/r∗ pn,t(i) > 0 if t > 0.
A.5 A Limit Result on the Probability of an Equilibrium Bank Run
Here we prove proposition 2. First, we claim that the sequence of interest rates is bounded
away from r¯.
Claim 3 There exists ε > 0 such that r∗n ≥ r¯ + ε for all n.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there is a subsequence {r∗nk} such that r∗nk → r¯. Let r˜ be
as in Lemma 7. Then, Unk(r
∗
nk
) ≥ Unk(r˜) for all k and Lemma 4 imply that U(r¯) ≥ U(r˜),
a contradiction.
Hence,
{
i > 1r¯+ε
}
⊆
{
i > 1r∗n
}
, and so
γn =
∫ t¯
0
f(t)
 ∑
i∈Sn:i>1/r∗n
pn,t(i)
dt ≥ ∫ t¯
0
f(t)
(∫ 1
0
χ(1/(r¯+ε),1]dpn,t
)
dt. (54)
Let δ > 0 and g : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be a continuous function satisfying g = χ(1/(r¯+ε),1] in
[0, 1/(r¯ + ε)] ∪ [1/(r¯ + ε) + δ, 1]. Then,∫ t¯
0
f
(∫ 1
0
gdpn,t
)
dt→
∫ t¯
0
fg ≥ 1− F (1/(r¯ + ε) + δ). (55)
Since g ≤ χ(1/(r¯+ε),1], we obtain
lim inf
n
∫ t¯
0
f(t)
(∫ 1
0
χ(1/(r¯+ε),1]dpn,t
)
dt ≥ 1− F (1/(r¯ + ε) + δ); (56)
since this holds for all δ > 0, it follows that
lim inf
n
∫ t¯
0
f(t)
(∫ 1
0
χ(1/(r¯+ε),1]dpn,t
)
dt ≥ 1− F (1/(r¯ + ε)), (57)
by letting δ → 0. Hence, lim infn γn ≥ 1− F (1/(r¯ + ε)) > 0, as desired.
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